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ABSTRACT:    
Using individual based micro-data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), I 
analyze the cyclicality of real wages for male workers within employer-employee matches 
over the period 1984–2004, and compare different wage measures: the standard hourly wage 
rate, hourly wage earnings including overtime and bonus payments, and the effective wage, 
which takes into account not only paid overtime, but also unpaid working hours. None of the 
hourly wage measures is shown to exhibit cyclicality except for the group of salaried workers 
with unpaid overtime. Their effective wages react strongly to changes in unemployment in a 
procyclical way. Despite acyclical wage rates, salaried workers without unpaid hours but with 
income from extra payments, such as bonuses, experienced procyclical earnings movements. 
Monthly  earnings  were  also  procyclical  for  hourly  paid  workers  who  received  overtime 
payments. The procyclicality of earnings revealed for Germany is of comparable size with the 
one in the U.S..  
 
 
JEL:   E32, J31 
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July 2007  NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY:  
Up to the early 1990s, real wages in the U.S. and in Europe were considered to be 
almost  noncyclical  by  macroeconomists  who  derived  this  evidence  from  analyses  of 
aggregate  time  series.  However,  the  use  of  longitudinal  microdata  allows  researchers  to 
follow the same workers over time, and more recent micro-based studies showed that wages 
in fact react to recessions and expansions in a procyclical way. The phenomenon that real 
wages  at  an  aggregate  level  barely  exhibit  any  cyclicality  was  attributed  to  composition 
effects. It was shown that the movement of real wages with the cycle is not visible due to a 
composition bias, which arises from a higher share of low-skilled workers being employed 
during peaks. A number of studies found wage procyclicality particularly for workers who 
change  employers,  but  more  recently  also  for  workers  who  stay  with  the  same  firm. 
Furthermore, the cyclicality of real wages was found to differ strongly between salaried and 
hourly paid workers, and between different wage measures, depending on whether overtime 
and bonus payments are taken into account.  
Existing studies on the cyclicality of real wage concentrate on the U.S. and the U.K. 
economies, which are acknowledged to be quite flexible labor markets. The aim of this study 
is therefore to reveal whether previous findings of procyclical estimates for job stayers can be 
validated for Germany, a labor market that is known as being relatively inflexible in terms of 
wage setting and employment protection. A further objective of this study is to compare the 
cyclicality  of  different  wage  measures.  In  addition  to  the  standard  hourly  wage  rate  and 
hourly  wage  earnings  including  overtime  and  bonus  payments,  a  new  wage  measure  is 
examined, which takes into account not only paid overtime, but also unpaid working hours. 
Effective  wages  are  calculated  by  averaging  total  earnings  over  all  working  hours,  i.e. 
standard hours, paid overtime and unpaid overtime. The effective wage is therefore the real 
compensation of the total work done, and has not been examined in the wage cyclicality 
literature before.  
Using  individual  based  micro-data  from  the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel  Study 
(SOEP) for the period 1984 to 2004, the cyclicality of these different wage measures, and of 
two  monthly  earnings  measures  are  analyzed  within  employer-employee  matches.  When 
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unemployment rate, a two-step estimation technique and weighted least squares are applied. 
Despite the different nature of the German labor market, the findings are similar to previous 
results for the U.S.. In spite of acyclical hourly wages, hourly paid workers with additional 
income from overtime pay had procyclical movements in their monthly earnings. Hence, it 
seems that adjustments over the business cycle are realized through working hours of hourly 
paid workers at relatively stable hourly wages.  
For salaried workers who do not change their employer, no cyclicality of the hourly 
wage  rates  is  found  either.  However,  salaried  workers  in  the  private  sector  who  receive 
additional income from extra payments or overtime had procyclical earnings, which are of 
similar size as in the U.S.. Hence, acyclical base salaries are compatible with procyclical 
overall earnings also in the West German labor market. The overall compensation of salaried 
workers seems to be adjusted over the cycle through extra payments, such as bonuses. For the 
sample of salaried workers with unpaid overtime, the effective wage rate turns out to exhibit a 
strong  and  statistically  significant  procyclicality.  The  effective  wage  of  these  workers 
decreased by 1.7% as reaction to a one point increase in the unemployment rate. This shows 
that the West German labor market displays considerable wage flexibility for this worker 
group. Moreover, the strong procyclicality of effective wages for salaried unpaid overtime 
workers supports the notion that unpaid overtime is prevailing during recessions, and hence 
decreases the real hourly compensation of the total work done, when unemployment is rising. 
This might be explained by an increase in unpaid overtime worked during recessions, when 
the workers’ bargaining position worsens and their risk of job loss is higher. In addition, this 
is  consistent  with  the  idea  that  the  amount  of  overtime  hours  worked  is  stable  over  the 
business cycle, but overtime is compensated for in expansions, and not in recessions. 
To sum up, for the majority of workers within employer-employee matches, hourly 
wages do not adjust to the cycle. Therefore, sticky wages seem to be prevailing in a relatively 
inflexible economy like in the German labor market. This finding is consistent with recent 
findings on the U.S., but in stark contrast to studies on the U.K. labor market, where strong 
wage procyclicality for job stayers was found. However, while the non-cyclicality of real 
wage rates should be a property of macroeconomic models for the German economy, both 
hourly paid and salaried workers with additional income from overtime pay or extra payments 
experienced procyclical earnings, which are found to be strongly procyclical particularly in 
the private sector. 
6
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 783
July 2007 
1.  Introduction 
Up to the early 1990s, real wages in the U.S. and in Europe were considered to be almost 
noncyclical by macroeconomists who derived this evidence from analyses of aggregate time 
series.  However,  the  use  of  longitudinal  microdata  allows  researchers  to  follow  the  same 
workers over time, and more recent micro-based studies showed that wages in fact react to 
recessions and expansions in a procyclical way. Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) attribute the 
phenomenon that real wages at an aggregate level barely show any cyclicality to composition 
effects. They demonstrate that the movement of real wages with the cycle is not visible due to 
a composition bias, which arises from a higher share of low-skilled workers being employed 
during peaks. A number of studies found wage procyclicality particularly for workers who 
change employers, but more recently also for workers who stay with the same firm. Recent 
work by Devereux (2001) and others reveals that the cyclicality of real wages differs strongly 
between salaried and hourly paid workers, and between different wage measures, depending 
on whether overtime and bonus payments are taken into account.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature on the cyclicality of real wages in two ways. Most 
important, it provides first evidence for Germany, using individual based micro-data from the 
German  Socio-Economic  Panel  Study  (SOEP)  for  the  period  1984  to  2004.  While  the 
previous studies concentrate on the U.S. and the U.K. labor market, which are acknowledged 
to be quite flexible in terms of wage setting and job mobility, the objective of this study is to 
reveal whether previous findings can be validated for a labor market that is known as being 
relatively inflexible. It is quite possible that labor market rigidities, which may stem from the 
presence of unions or from employment protection legislation, affect the sensitivity of the real 
wage to the business cycle. Therefore, it will be investigated whether findings of previous 
studies  on  Anglo-American  economies  can  be  transmitted  to  more  regulated  economies. 
Second, further evidence on real wage cyclicality is produced by comparing the cyclicality of 
different  wage  measures.  In  addition  to  the  standard  hourly  wage  rate  and  hourly  wage 
earnings including overtime and bonus payments, a new wage measure is examined, which 
takes into account not only paid overtime, but also unpaid working hours. Effective wages are 
calculated  by  averaging  total  earnings  over  all  working  hours,  i.e.  standard  hours,  paid 
7
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overtime and unpaid overtime. The effective wage is therefore the real compensation of the 
total work done, and has not been examined in the wage cyclicality literature before.
1  
 
The cyclicality of effective wages is an important issue to get a more accurate picture of real 
wages and to achieve a better understanding of the determination of wages, extra payments, 
and working hours, and their adjustment over the business cycle. By decomposing overall 
wage cyclicality by different worker groups and identifying the main contributors of overall 
wage  variability,  one  can  derive  predictions  on  how  real  wages  adjustments  evolve  over 
future business cycles. Moreover, the understanding of the cyclical behavior of both wages 
and working hours are crucial for the development of macroeconomic models. This study 
provides  micro-based  evidence  on  whether  sticky  wages  are  prevailing  in  a  relatively 
inflexible economy, and whether wage cyclicality should be a property in macroeconomic 




2.  The Cyclicality of Real Wages 
For a long time, macroeconomists agreed that real wages are quite stable over the business 
cycle.
2 This belief was based on evidence from aggregate time series and considered as a 
stylized fact. Hence, theoretical macroeconomic models, such as efficiency wage theory or the 
theory of implicit contracts, evolved in order to explain the non-cyclicality of wages in the 
presence of a large variability in employment. However, disaggregating data has revealed that 
the weak cyclicality of wages arises from the changing composition of the workforce over the 
business cycle. Higher shares of low-skilled workers during peaks cause wages to be averaged 
over  workers  with  lower  earnings  potential  than  in  low  employment  times.  The  use  of 
longitudinal microdata allows researchers to follow the same workers over time, and more 
recent micro-based studies showed that wages in fact react to recessions and expansions in a 
procyclical way. Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) were the first who stressed the importance 
of this effect, and showed that the countercyclical composition bias causes the movement of 
real wages with the cycle to be non-visible. The concensus in the literature, using U.S. micro 
                                                 
1 However, effective wages have been analyzed in a different context by Bell and Hart (1999) and Bell, Hart, 
Hübler, and Schwerdt (2000). 
2 See Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) for an overview. 
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data was that a year-to-year increase in unemployment by 10 percent reduces wages of male 
workers by almost one percent (Bils, 1985; Rayack, 1987; Blank, 1990; Solon et al., 1994).  
 
A number of studies differentiate between workers who stay with their jobs and those who 
change jobs. Some of them reveal wage procyclicality particularly for workers who change 
employers. Bils (1985) finds that wages of firm stayers are only slightly procyclical, while 
those of firm changers are very procyclical.
3 The stronger cyclicality of wages for between-
company movers is confirmed by Shin (1994) who yet finds substantial wage procyclicality 
even for company stayers.
4 Likewise, Solon et al. (1994) and a more recent study by Shin and 
Shin (2003) also reveal procyclicality of real wages for workers who stay with the same firm.
5 
In contrast, Devereux (2001) finds weak evidence of wage procyclicality within employer-
employee matches using data on male job stayers from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). However, he investigates different sources of payments, and reveals that hourly paid 
workers experience procyclical earnings movements despite  acyclical wage  rates, i.e. that 
adjustments  over  the  business  cycle  are  realized  through  working  hours  at  stable  wages. 
Moreover, salaried workers are found to earn acyclical salaries, but procyclical earnings if 
they  receive  bonuses  or  overtime  payments.  In  their  attempt  to  replicate  the  findings  of 
Devereux with data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Shin and Solon 
(2006) do not find supporting evidence for the noncyclicality of real wages among salaried 
job  stayers.  However,  they  confirm  the  finding  that  overtime  pay  contributes  to  the 
discrepancy  between  the  cyclicality  of  the  standard  hourly  wage  rate  and  average  hourly 
earnings.  
 
Micro-based panel studies on the U.K. confirm the procyclicality of real wages. Hart (2006a) 
focuses on worker-job matches instead of worker-firm matches, and differentiates between 
full-time job stayers and job movers who move either within or between firms.
6 Using the 
British  New  Earnings  Survey  Panel  Data  (NESPD)  he  finds  that  real  wages  are  strongly 
procyclical for both job stayers and movers, with an even stronger wage responsiveness than 
previously found for the U.S.. The procyclicality of the wage rate is more pronounced among 
job movers and manual workers, and not significantly different from the cyclicality of hourly 
                                                 
3 When taking into account overtime earnings, he finds procyclicality of wages even when aggregating the data. 
4 This higher procyclicality of job changers has been attributed to the existence of implicit contracts (Beaudry 
and DiNardo, 1991; McDonald and Worswick, 1999; Grant, 2003, Devereux and Hart, 2005), or to 
compensating differentials (Barlevy, 2001).  
5 They show that wage adjustments occur particularly in high employment times, which is evidence against the 
spot market model, where wage adjustments take place during both expansions and recessions. 
6 See Hart (2006b) for an analysis of real wage cyclicality for female workers in part-time and full-time jobs. 
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wage earnings, including overtime pay. A more detailed analysis by differentiating between 
within-company job movers, between-company job movers and job stayers is provided by 
Devereux and Hart (2006).
7 Using also the British NESPD on fulltime workers, they find 
wages  of  job  stayers  to  be  strongly  procyclical,  although  the  procyclicality  is  more 
pronounced among internal movers, and strongest among external movers. Moreover, they 
show that the wage cyclicality of job movers is much higher than that of job stayers in the 
private sector and among workers uncovered by collective bargaining.  
 
One strand of research closely related to real wage cyclicality is the literature on the wage 
curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994), which describes the negative relationship between 
the level of local unemployment and the level of wages. The estimated equation resembles 
much the one of the studies on the cyclicality of real wages, but this link is barely  ever 
mentioned in the wage curve literature. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) find evidence of a 
negative relationship between real wages and local unemployment for Great Britain and the 
US, and present three alternative models more or less consistent with their findings (Card, 
1995):  an  implicit  contract  model,  an  efficiency  wage  model,  and  a  bargaining  model. 
Empirical evidence of the wage curve has been found for numerous other countries, including 
Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. Blanchflower and Oswald (1996) also estimate the 
relationship between the levels of wages and unemployment for Germany, and find an effect 
of unemployment on wages for gender- and age-specific unemployment rates. Several other 
studies show the existence of a wage curve also for general unemployment rates in Germany 
(Wagner, 1994; Baltagi and Blien, 1998; Pannenberg and Schwarze, 1989, 2000; Bellmann 
and Blien, 2001 Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf, 2000). However, many of the existing wage curve 
studies merely use repeated cross-sections rather than panel data, and are therefore not able to 
control  for  unobserved  individual  characteristics.  Furthermore,  most  of  the  studies  on  the 
German wage curve are only based on a few years of observations. The wage curve aims at 
explaining regional wage differentials of workers in labor markets with different levels of 
local unemployment at one point in time, and therefore tracks a static problem. In contrast, the 
issue of wage cyclicality is a dynamic matter, asking how real wages evolve over time with 
the variability in unemployment or other cyclical variables. Empirical studies on the wage 
curve therefore generally lack of the dynamic aspect of the variability of wages. Moreover, 
                                                 
7 Wage cyclicality analyses that distinguish between external and internal mobility were first provided by case 
studies on U.S. companies. Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997) use data from the interwar period and find 
wages of intra-firm job movers to be more procyclical than of job stayers. Wilson (1997) uses more recent data 




Working Paper Series No 783
July 2007 
they do not distinguish between wages at firm-entry and those of firm stayers. As most wage 
curve  studies  for  Germany  consider  only  few  years  of  observations,  they  are  not  able  to 




3.  Data 
The data used in this study were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP). The SOEP is a representative longitudinal micro-database that provides a wide range 
of socio-economic information on private households and their individuals in Germany. The 
yearly data were first collected from about 12,200 randomly selected adult respondents (in 
6,000 families) in West Germany in 1984. After German reunification in 1990, the SOEP was 
extended by about 4,500 persons (in 2,200 families) from East Germany, and supplemented 
by expansion samples in 1998, 2000, and 2002. In the most recent wave, in 2005, about 
21,000 respondents were participating in the panel study.
8 I use data from 1984 to 2005 for 
West  German  male  workers  aged  between  20  and  60,  excluding  Berlin.  To  ensure 
comparability of the results with those of previous studies, attention is restricted to full-time 
employees within employer-employee matches holding single jobs. The sample contains only 
full-time workers with monthly earnings of at least 500€ in order to exclude observations with 
implausibly low incomes. Short-time workers and those working less than 30 hours per week 
were excluded from the study. Respondents with missing information on earnings, working 
hours or other variables included in the estimations were also dropped from the sample. In the 
unbalanced panel, only respondents who participated in at least two waves of the survey are 
included in order to be able to observe changes in their real wages. When an employment 
spell is interrupted by unemployment or economic inactivity, an individual drops out of the 
sample, but is picked up in later years in case he is re-employed. In total, the sub-sample 
consists of about 38,000 person-year-observations.  
 
The  SOEP  provides  not  only  information  on  monthly  gross  earnings  including  overtime 
payments, but also on extra payments, such as Christmas bonus, holiday pay, income from 
profit sharing, and other bonuses. Extra payments have become increasingly important in 
                                                 
8 The SOEP data is available as a public-use file containing 95% of the SOEP sample, with some variables 
omitted for reasons of data protection (see Wagner, Burkhauser, and Behringer, 1993, or for more detailed 
information, Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005).  
11
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recent years, and have been shown to significantly contribute to the procyclicality of earnings 
in the U.S. (Devereux, 2001). In the SOEP, information on extra payments are revealed on an 
annual basis in the subsequent wave of a respective year. These bonuses can be converted into 
monthly payments and added to the monthly gross earnings for those workers who have not 
changed their job during the year.
9 Moreover, labor income including extra payments is only 
available  for  workers  who  participate  in  the  survey  for  two  consecutive  years,  and 
observations in 2005 cannot be used except for the information on extra payments. Hence, 
workers have to participate for at least three waves in the survey to ensure that changes in 
their real wages including extra payments can be observed. As a result, the inclusion of extra 
payments in this study leads to a considerable reduction in the sample size. However, since 
these  additional  payments  are  considered  to  be  substantial  for  the  analysis  of  real  wage 
cyclicality, observations without this information are nevertheless dropped. Figure 1 shows 
that  the  importance  of  bonus  payments  has  been  increasing  in  Germany,  as  not  only  the 
proportion of workers with bonus payments but also the average share of bonus payments in 
monthly base earnings has risen sharply since the mid 1980s.  
 
 
-  Figure 1 about here – 
 
 
All earnings are deflated using the West German Consumer Price Index (the base year used in 
this  study  is  1984).  The  SOEP  asks  survey  respondents  for  detailed  information  on  their 
working hours. Workers provide information on their contractual hours and on their actual 
working  time,  i.e.  the  weekly  hours  they  usually  work  on  average,  including  overtime.
10 
Moreover, if a worker indicates that he works overtime, he is asked for the compensation of 
these extra hours, which may be overtime pay, leisure compensation, or no compensation at 
all.
11 This allows to differentiate between contractual hours, paid overtime hours, and unpaid 
overtime hours in the analysis. 
 
                                                 
9 Since extra payments are declared on an annual basis, they are not dependent on the month of the interview and 
therefore unaffected by seasonal variations. 
10 The SOEP also provides information on the number of overtime hours worked during the last month before 
the interview. However, since these working hours might not be representative of the average over the whole 
year due to seasonality, overtime hours in this study are calculated as the difference between the usually worked 
actual hours and the contracted working time of a worker. 
11 However, the responses with respect to the compensation of overtime are mutually exclusive in the SOEP 
questionnaire, e.g. a worker cannot work paid and unpaid overtime hours at the same time. 
12
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Three different wage measures are generated by dividing earnings from various sources by the 
respective  working  hours.  First,  the  standard  hourly  wage  rate  is  defined  as  hourly 
compensation  for  a  contractual  working  hour.  Hence,  monthly  gross  earnings  have  to  be 
calculated net of overtime payments, for which a premium of 25% is assumed.
12 Dividing 
these adjusted monthly gross earnings by contractual working hours then yields the standard 
hourly wage. Second, the average hourly wage including overtime and bonus payments is 
calculated by dividing total earnings, i.e. monthly earnings including overtime payments and 
monthly extra payments, by all paid hours, i.e. contractual hours and paid overtime, but not 
unpaid working hours.
13 Third, a new wage measure is introduced, which takes into account 
not only paid overtime, but also unpaid working hours. Hence, effective wages are calculated 
by averaging total earnings over all working hours, i.e. standard hours, paid overtime and 
unpaid overtime.
14 Taking into account all working hours is particularly important for those 
workers  with  excessive  unpaid  working  time,  for  whom  the  standard  or  average  wage 
overstates the actual hourly compensation. It has already been shown that unpaid hours may 
lead to a substantial wage drift for some worker groups.
15 Depending on the cyclicality of 
overtime and extra payments, the average and the effective wage can be more or less cyclical 
than the standard wage rate. Since economic reasoning and evidence from previous studies 
gives us grounds to assume that extra payments and paid overtime are procyclical, average 
wage earnings are expected to be more sensitive to the business cycle than the standard wage 
rate.  The  anticipation  with  respect  to  the  cyclicality  of  the  effective  wage  is  not  as 
straightforward. On the one hand, overtime hours in general are expected to increase during or 
at the beginning of expansions, when labor demand is high or starts to rise. If unpaid hours 
behave similarly to paid extra hours, this points to the procyclicality of unpaid overtime and 
causes effective wages to be less procyclical than average wage earnings. On the other hand, 
workers could increase their overtime hours in terms of unpaid work during recessions, when 
their bargaining position worsens and their risk of job loss is higher (Anger, 2005). In the 
latter case, the effective wage is expected to be even more procyclical than average wage 
                                                 
12 This overtime premium corresponds to the premium put down in most collective agreements in Germany. 
13 Some workers indicate that they work partially paid/partly leisure compensated overtime. Here, it is assumed 
that 40% of these overtime hours were actually paid. This number is derived from the question in the SOEP 
available since 2002, where respondents reveal how many overtime hours during the last month were paid. 
14 Since leisure-compensated overtime hours are ought to be taken as time-off at a later point in time, these extra 
hours should in theory not be part of the average working time usually worked. There is no reliable information 
but only speculation on how many leisure-compensated overtime hours are not claimed and therefore become 
forfeited. Consequently, this study does not take into account leisure-compensated overtime hours. The effective 
wage can therefore be considered as a conservative measure. 
15 Bell and Hart (1999) show for managers and professionals in the U.K. that their high levels of unpaid hours 
lead to actual hourly earnings of about 90% of their paid-for earnings. Bell, Hart, Hübler, and Schwerdt (2000) 
find similar evidence for Germany. 
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earnings. The same impact on the cyclicality of the effective wage is obtained if the amount of 
overtime hours worked was stable over the business cycle, but overtime was compensated for 
in expansions, and not in recessions. This would imply that merely the compensation form of 
extra work adjusts to current business cycle conditions.
16  
 
In addition to the three different wage measures, the cyclicality of monthly earnings, of both 
basic earnings and those including overtime and extra payments, will be analyzed below. 
Monthly earnings have the advantage of avoiding any potential bias from measurement error 
in  hours  worked,  if  these  are  inaccurately  quantified.
17  In  the  literature  on  real  wage 
cyclicality, national unemployment has been widely used as measure of the business cycle. In 
line with previous studies, wage cyclicality is measured as the reaction of the workers’ wages 
to changes in the unemployment rate. The yearly average of the West German unemployment 
rate  is  provided  by  the  Federal  Statistical  Office  and  refers  to  registered  unemployment. 
Figure  2  shows  the  standard  hourly  real  wage  for  the  years  1984  to  2005  and  the  West 
German unemployment rate.
18 While the cyclicality of unemployment is clearly visible, the 
real wage averaged over all workers in the sample described above barely shows any cyclical 
behavior, but a fairly steady upward trend. 
 
 
-  Figure 2 about here – 
 
 
Again, to ensure comparability with the results from previous research, the control variables 
included are work experience, its square term, and  its cubic term. Summary statistics are 
provided  in  Table  1,  which  separates  the  sample  according  to  the  workers’  methods  of 
payments.  The  population  weights  provided  by  the  SOEP  are  used  to  weight  the 
descriptives.
19 It is obvious that the remuneration differs strongly between hourly paid and 
salaried workers. Whereas 40% of the hourly paid workers in the sample received overtime 
payments, only 10% of salaried workers received financial compensation for their extra work. 
The  percentage  of  employees  with  extra  payments  is  only  slightly  higher  among  salaried 
workers, but a comparison of the monthly earnings reveals that workers with a salary receive 
                                                 
16 Evidence for a relatively stable amount of total overtime with changing compensation over the cycle is found 
by Bauer and Zimmermann (1999). 
17 See Devereux (2001) for a discussion on the measurement error in working hours. 
18 Using the other wage measures described above produces very similar graphs. 
19 Sample weights are not used for the later part of the analysis for efficiency reasons. 
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-  Table 1 about here – 
 
 
The relatively high share of employees with unpaid overtime among salaried workers (24%) 
indicates that the effective wage measure may be relevant particularly for this worker group. 
A  comparison  of  the  wage  measures  of  salaried  workers  shows  that  taking  into  account 
unpaid  working  hours  leads  to  a  significant  drop  in  the  effective  wage  compared  to  the 
average wage rate, which only considers paid hours. In contrast, average wage and effective 
wage  rate  are  identical  for  hourly  paid  workers,  among  whom  the  percentage  of  unpaid 
overtime workers is only 2%. Furthermore, the table displays mean changes in real earnings 
and  in  real  wages,  which  are  both  expressed  in  logarithms  as  they  are  used  in  the  later 
analysis. The changes in earnings and wages are of comparable size, regardless of whether 
overtime pay, extra payments or unpaid working hours are taken into account, but they are 
significantly larger for the group of salaried workers. The high standard deviations indicate a 
wide distribution in earnings and wage changes. Both pay cuts and pay rises were observed in 
the sample. With “no wage change” being defined as a change in real hourly wage between 
two years within the bounds of  +/- 1% as in Devereux and Hart (2006), 55% of salaried 
workers in the sample experienced an increase in their standard hourly real wage, whereas 
35%  experienced  a  wage  cut.  Among  hourly  paid  workers,  41%  suffered  a  real  wage 
reduction, whereas 52% gained from a wage rise.
20 These numbers compare to 51% of male 
(53% of female) job stayers in the U.K. who experienced a wage increase in 1997, and to 29% 






                                                 
20 Taking into account adjustments of working hours revealed very similar numbers: 53% (54%) of salaried 
workers experienced an increase in their real monthly earnings (including overtime and extra payments), 
whereas 34% (35%) experienced an earnings cut. Among hourly paid workers, 42% (42%) suffered a real 
earnings reduction, whereas 49% (50%) gained from rise in their monthly earnings. 
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4.  Estimation Methods 
As  in  most  micro-based  studies  on  real  wage  cyclicality,  the  estimation  of  the  wage 
cyclicality  in  the  present  study  follows  Bils  (1985),  and  is  based  on  the  following  wage 
change equation: 
(1)    it it t it t X U w e a a a a + + + D + = D 4 3 2 1 ln  
where Dln wit is the change in the natural logarithm of worker i’s real wage in year t compared 
to  year  t-1.  DUt  represents  the  year-to  year  change  in  the  national  (West  German) 
unemployment rate, Xit is a vector of worker characteristics which contains a cubic in work 
experience, t is a linear time trend, and eit is the error term. a1 is the individual specific effect, 
and a2, a3, and a4 are parameters to be estimated. The parameter of main interest is a2, which 
is negative if wages react to changes in unemployment in a procyclical way. The regression 
model is kept deliberately parsimonious to ensure comparability  with other studies which 
likewise include polynomials of experience as only exogenous variables. The inclusion of a 
cubic in tenure as additional worker characteristics like in the estimates of Devereux (2001) 
for job stayers and in some of the other previous studies did not seriously affect the results. 
Nor did the inclusion of additional controls for worker characteristics. According to Solon et 
al.  (1994),  the  problem  of  composition  bias  can  be  avoided  in  two  different  ways:  First, 
restricting the sample to a balanced panel would imply the assignment of fixed weights to the 
same workers over time. However, the requirement that one must have a wage observation for 
every  worker  in  each  year  from  1984  to  2004,  would  shrink  the  sample  substantially. 
Therefore,  in  line  with Devereux  (2001)  and  other  previous  studies,  an  unbalanced  panel 
design is used. Equation (1) controls implicitly for wage effects of time-invariant worker 
characteristics, as these are netted out in the measurement of year-to-year changes. 
 
The estimation of the model above by conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) involves a 
potential problem, which arises from matching data on the individual level with aggregated 
data. Moulton (1990) demonstrates that estimating models with mixtures of individual and 
grouped data can lead to a substantial underestimation of the standard errors if common group 
errors are not accounted for. This arises because individuals within the same cluster who 
share  this  observable  characteristic  might  also  share  unobservable  characteristics,  which 
might cause the error terms to be correlated across workers within the same year. Using the 
same value of the explanatory variable for all persons in the same year might therefore lead to 
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a  downward  bias  in  the  estimated  standard  errors  of  the  year-to  year  change  in 
unemployment, leading to spurious inference.  
 
To avoid this problem, Solon et al. (1994), Shin (1994), Solon et al. (1997), and Devereux 
(2001) used a two-step estimation technique. The first stage estimates the change in log wages 
on the vector of worker characteristics and on year dummies using OLS. In the second stage, 
the coefficients on the year dummies obtained in the first step are regressed on the change in 
unemployment and on a linear time trend. Devereux (2001) suggests to estimate the second 
stage by using weighted least squares (WLS), where the weight for each year’s observation is 
derived  from  the  number  of  individual  observations  in  that  given  year.  As  mentioned  in 
Devereux (2001), consistent estimates are also obtained by using Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS), which has been shown to yield similar results. For the sake of comparability with 
previous studies, the two-step technique of Devereux (2001) will be applied in the present 
study. 
 
In the first step, the following equation is estimated by OLS: 
(2)  it t
T
t
t it it D X w e f b b + + + = D ∑
=1
2 1 ln  
where Dt represents the vector of year dummies which equal one if the observation is from 
year t, and zero otherwise. In the second step, the estimates of the time dummy variables  t f ˆ  
from (2) are picked up and regressed on the change in unemployment and the linear time 
trend:  
(3)  t t t t U u d d d f + + D + = 3 2 1 ˆ  
The second-step equation is estimated using WLS, with the weights being derived from the 
number  of  individual  observations  in  each  year.  Robust  standard  errors  are  computed  to 
control for  correlation of the error terms. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, 
the change of the log wages is multiplied by 100. This enables us to interpret the estimated 
coefficients on the change in unemployment as percentage change in the wage as reaction to a 
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5.  Results 
In  the  following,  the  results  of  equation  (3)  are  presented  for  different  samples  of  West 
German male workers using different wage and earnings measures. The tables below display 
the coefficients on the change in unemployment over the full 21-year period. As explained 
above, movements of monthly earnings over the business cycle will be analyzed in addition to 
the  real  wage  cyclicality,  as  per-period  earnings  allow  an  analysis  of  the  cyclicality  of 
workers’  remuneration  independently  of  hours  worked.  Before  employees  are  analyzed 
separately according to their methods of payments, the cyclicality of earnings and wages of 
all firm stayers, hourly paid and salaried workers, will be considered. Table 2 shows the real 
earnings and wage cyclicality for all employer-employee matches (first row), and for those 
workers being employed in the private sector (second row). While basic monthly earnings of 
all firm stayers exhibit procyclical movements, monthly earnings react stronger to the cycle 
when overtime pay and extra payments are taken into account. Both the average wage rate 
and the effective wage display a modest procyclicality, where the cyclicality of the effective 
wage  is  more  pronounced.  This  may  be  a  first  indication  of  unpaid  overtime  being 
countercyclical,  and  hence  decrease  the  effective  wage  particularly  during  recessions. 
However, all estimates are very noisy and not statistically significant. Excluding public sector 
workers leads to a slightly higher procyclicality of both monthly earnings and hourly wage 
rates, but again the estimates are not statistically significant from zero. In the following, the 
earnings  and  wage  cyclicality  will  be  estimated  separately  for  hourly  paid  and  salaried 
workers. Figure 3 shows plots of the estimated coefficients on the year dummies against the 
change in unemployment for some of the sub-samples analyzed below.  
 
 




Hourly Paid Workers 
The earnings and wage cyclicality for hourly paid workers who do not change employers is 
shown in Table 3. Compared to the estimates for all workers in Table 2, the procyclicality of 
both earnings and wages is slightly more pronounced among employees who are hourly paid. 
In  the  full  sample  (first  row),  the  estimates  are  again  very  noisy  and  not  statistically 
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significant.  However, when only  workers with  overtime payments are  considered  (second 
row), the coefficients on the change in unemployment are not only higher than in the full 
sample, but also statistically significant in the estimates of monthly earnings. A one point 
increase  in  the  West  German  unemployment  rate  is  associated  with  a  reduction  in  basic 
earnings by 1% and with a decrease in overall earnings including overtime pay by about 1.2% 
for workers in this sample. Paid overtime hence exhibits a procyclical behavior, being higher 
during upswings when labor demand is rising. The procyclicality of earnings is only slightly 
higher for hourly paid workers in the private sector (third row), and still significant at the 10% 
and the 5% level. The size of these earnings effects compares with an earnings procyclicality 
of about 1.9% for job stayers with no extra job for the U.S. (Devereux, 2001). All measures of 
the hourly wage rate exhibit procyclical signs, but the estimates are not statistically different 
from  zero.  Although  the  hourly  real  wage  of  hourly  paid  workers  shows  no  significant 
cyclicality, regardless of the wage measures considered, hourly paid workers with overtime 
pay  experience  procyclical  per-period  earnings  movements.  This  may  indicate  that 




-  Table 3 about here – 
 
 





Table 4 displays results for workers that are remunerated with a monthly salary. The earnings 
and wage effects are shown for the full sample of salaried workers (first row), for those who 
receive extra payments (second row), for workers with extra payments in the private sector 
(third row), and for those with extra payments and overtime pay in the private sector (fourth 
row). As in the sample of hourly paid workers above, none of the hourly wage measures 
seems to react to the business cycle in any of the four sub-samples. The coefficients on the 
change  in  unemployment  are  of  neither  economic  nor  statistical  significance.  Likewise, 
workers  in  the  full  sample  of  salaried  workers  and  in  the  sample  of  workers  with  extra 
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payments did not have procyclical earnings. However, when workers employed in the public 
sector are omitted, a statistically significant procyclical effect is found for monthly earnings 
including overtime and extra payments. This procyclicality is even more pronounced when 
the  estimates  are  restricted  to  employees  in  the  private  sector  who  received  overtime 
payments.  Their  overall  earnings  were  reduced  by  about  1%  as  reaction  to  a  one  point 
increase in the unemployment rate. As for hourly paid workers, paid overtime of salaried 
workers  is  found  to  exhibit  a  procyclical  behavior.  The  size  of  this  earnings  effect  is 
comparable to the procyclicality of earnings found by Devereux (2001) for U.S. job stayers 
with a single job and with non-salary income (coefficient of –0.95, significant at the 5% 
level).  The  finding  of  Devereux  (2001)  that  salaried  workers  in  the  U.S.  earn  acyclical 
salaries, but procyclical earnings if they receive bonuses or overtime payments, can hence be 
confirmed for the West German labor market.  
 
 
-  Table 4 about here – 
 
 
Next, the sample is restricted to salaried employees who work unpaid extra hours. For these 
workers,  monthly  earnings  are  unaffected  by  longer  working  hours,  as  they  receive  no 
financial compensation for their extra work. At the same time, the hourly real compensation 
of the total work done is reduced with every additional unpaid hour worked. The wage and 
earnings cyclicality for the group of salaried workers with unpaid overtime is presented in 
Table 5, which shows results for the full sample (first row), for those workers with extra 
payments (second row), and for those with extra payments excluding the public sector (third 
row). In contrast to the results for all salaried workers, the unemployment coefficients in the 
monthly  earnings  estimates  are  not  statistically  significant  for  any  of  the  sub-samples. 
However, the effective hourly wage is clearly more procyclical than the standard wage and 
the average wage rate in all of the specifications, and most strikingly, the procyclicality of the 
effective wage is statistically different from zero. Hence, for the sample of unpaid overtime 
workers, the effective wage procyclicality is of both economic and statistical significance. A 
one point increase in the unemployment rate reduces the effective wage of salaried workers 
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-  Table 5 about here – 
 
 
The strongest real wage procyclicality is observed among workers with extra payments in the 
private sector, whose effective wage decreased by 1.7% as reaction to a one point increase in 
unemployment. The size of this wage effect is even stronger than that found in the U.S. for 
salaried job stayers (coefficient of –1.5 in Shin and Solon, 2006) and for salaried job stayers 
with  non-salary  income  (–0.8  in  Devereux,  2001).  However,  the  wage  measure  in  these 
studies are earnings divided by hours, i.e. the average wage, which makes the comparison of 
the results for the U.S. and the West German labor market difficult. The strong procyclicality 
of effective wages for unpaid overtime workers rejects the hypothesis that unpaid overtime is 
prevailing during expansions. Unpaid hours show a behavior which is exactly the opposite of 
the movement of paid overtime, which has been shown to increase during upswings, when 
labor demand is increasing. The effective compensation of unpaid overtime workers may be 
decreasing  during  recessions  either  because  they  increase  their  overall  overtime  hours  in 
terms of unpaid work in the face of rising unemployment, or because the compensation of 




Acyclical Wage Rates and Procyclical Earnings 
The  finding  that  earnings  exhibit  procyclical  movements  over  the  cycle  despite  acyclical 
hourly wage rates for most hourly paid and salaried workers might be attributed to different 
reasons. One explanation for the discrepancy between the cyclicality of hourly and per-period 
compensation was already mentioned above, and refers to the adjustment of working hours 
over the business cycle, which might lead to earnings cyclicality in the presence of stable 
hourly wages. Second, the finding that hourly wages exhibit no cyclicality might be attributed 
to  a  measurement  error  in  the  reporting  of  working  hours.  This  requires  that  the 
misrepresentation  of  working  hours  leads  to  a  countercyclical  bias,  and  therefore  to  an 
understated  cyclicality  of  the  hourly  wage  measures.  Devereux  (2001)  addresses  the 
measurement error in working hours, but supposes that the clumping of reported working 
hours at a certain hours level implies that the procyclicality of the average hourly wage is 
overstated. Shin and Solon (2006) investigate the issue of misreported working hours and find 
no  evidence  of  a  procyclical  bias.  They  conclude  that  there  is  indeed  a  tendency  to 
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underestimate the cyclicality of average hourly wages, which could hence explain the non-
cyclicality of the wage measures in the estimates above.   
 
Another possible reason why no wage cyclicality is found for most firm stayers in Germany 
as opposed to findings for the U.K. and to some extent for the U.S. is related to the problem 
of selectivity. When workers leave employment, their wages become unobservable and they 
drop out of the sample. If these workers are the ones with a particularly strong (hypothetical) 
wage  procyclicality,  the  estimated  cyclicality  of  real  wages  for  the  remaining  workforce 
understates the true overall wage cyclicality. Therefore, the composition bias might not only 
be a problem when observing aggregate wage data, but also in micro-data analyses. It is quite 
possible  that  the  problem  of  sample  selection  bias  is  not  as  severe  in  studies  on  Anglo-
American labor markets, where unemployment was not as high as it has been in Germany 
since the 1990s. In Germany, there is a much higher probability that those workers whose 
wages  are  strongly  affected  by  the  cycle  are  not  in  the  sample  due  to  unemployment  or 
economic inactivity. Hence, the high unemployment rate among particular worker groups in 
Germany might lead to an underestimation of the wage cyclicality, and even to the finding 
that wages are not cyclical at all. As pointed out by Devereux (2001), solving the problem of 
selectivity requires variables that affect the worker’s likelihood of being within an employer-
employee match, but not his wage. Such variables are extremely difficult if not impossible to 
find. Devereux (2001) refers to unsatisfactory attempts to solve the issue of sample selection 




The Phillips Curve 
The specification in equation (1) is competing with the specification of the Phillips curve, 
which establishes a negative relationship between the rate of change in wages and the level of 
the unemployment rate. However, a simple test suggested by Card (1995) allows to check the 
Phillips curve specification by decomposing the change in the unemployment rate DUt into the 
level of current unemployment Ut and the lag of unemployment Ut-1:  
(4)  1 2 1 2 - + = D t t t U U U g g a    
If both current and lagged unemployment included in the wage change equation, g1 and g2 ,  
are significant, of the same size, and of opposite signs, the present model is the preferred 
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specification. The finding of a significant coefficient on current unemployment g1, but an 
insignificant  coefficient  on  lag  of  unemployment  g2  would  support  the  Phillips  curve 
specification. Applying this test to the samples above reveals approximately equal magnitudes 
of the two unemployment coefficients with a negative current unemployment effect and a 
positive lagged unemployment effect on the change in wages. This supports the specification 
in the wage change equation (1). Showing wage and earnings effects of current and lagged 
unemployment, Table 6 presents exemplary results of this specification test for the group of 
salaried workers with unpaid overtime.  
 
 




State Unemployment Rates 
The finding that none of the hourly wage measures exhibits cyclicality apart from effective 
wages for the group of salaried workers with unpaid overtime may be traced back to the use 
of  the  national  unemployment  rate  as  cyclical  variable.  If  regions  within  a  country  are 
sufficiently heterogeneous, the change in the unemployment rate at the national level might be 
too aggregated and hence be inappropriate to represent cyclical shocks that affect wages in 
various  regions.  Since  regions  in  Germany  exhibit  great  heterogeneity,  a  disaggregated 
cyclical variable might be a more suitable measure.
21 Therefore, an alternative specification 
uses state unemployment rates instead of unemployment at the national level. The use of state 
unemployment rates introduces more degrees of freedom into the second stage equation, and 
allows to differentiate the time influence by means of year dummies rather than imposing a 
linear  time  trend  on  the  model  (Hart  2006c).  However,  the  specification  with  the  state 
unemployment  rates  as  cyclical  variable  reveals  even  less  evidence  for  the  procyclical 
movement  of  real  wages,  and  also  leads  to  insignificant  effects  of  the  change  in 
unemployment on monthly earnings.
22 This confirms the findings of Devereux (2001) for the 
U.S. using state unemployment rates. He points out that “when year effects are included, the 
                                                 
21 Both unemployment and changes in unemployment varied quite strongly between the West German states in 
the observed time period. The biggest difference occurred between the state of Baden-Württemberg with an 
unemployment rate of 5.4% and Bremen with 15.2% in 1985 (7.8% and 18.3% in 2005), their changes in 
unemployment in 1985 amounting to -0.2 and +1.4 (+0.9 and +3.9 in 2005) respectively. 
22 The coefficients are not reported here, but are available from the author on request. 
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state unemployment rate captures the differences in the cycle across states. Thus, it is not 




6.  Conclusion 
Existing  studies  on  the  cyclicality  of  real  wage  concentrate  on  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K. 
economies, which are acknowledged to be quite flexible labor markets. The aim of this study 
was therefore to reveal whether previous findings of procyclical estimates for job stayers can 
be validated for Germany, a labor market that is known as being relatively inflexible in terms 
of  wage  setting  and  employment  protection.  A  further  objective  of  this  study  was  to 
investigate the cyclicality of a new wage measure which has not been examined in the wage 
cyclicality literature before. In addition to the standard hourly wage rate and average hourly 
wage earnings including overtime and bonus payments, effective wages were analyzed. These 
take into account unpaid overtime, and are calculated by averaging total earnings over all 
working hours. The effective wage is therefore the real compensation of the total work done. 
Using individual based micro-data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) for 
the period 1984 to 2004, the cyclicality of these different wage measures, and of two monthly 
earnings measures was analyzed within employer-employee matches. When estimating the 
reaction of the according wage measure to changes in the West German unemployment rate, 
the two-step estimation technique and weighted least squares used by Devereux (2001) and 
other previous studies were applied.  
 
Despite the different nature of the German labor market, the findings are similar to previous 
results  for  the  U.S..  In  spite  of  acyclical  hourly  real  wages,  hourly  paid  workers  with 
additional income from overtime pay had procyclical movements in their monthly earnings. 
Hence, it seems that adjustments over the business cycle are realized through working hours 
of hourly paid workers at relatively stable hourly wages. For salaried workers who do not 
change  their  employer,  no  cyclicality  of  the  hourly  wage  rates  is  found  either.  However, 
salaried workers in the private sector who receive additional income from extra payments or 
overtime had procyclical earnings, which are of similar size as in the U.S. (estimates of –0.7 
to –1.0). Hence, acyclical base salaries are compatible with procyclical overall earnings also 
in the West German labor market. The overall compensation of salaried workers seems to be 
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adjusted over the cycle through extra payments, such as bonuses. For the sample of salaried 
workers  with  unpaid  overtime,  the  effective  wage  rate  turns  out  to  exhibit  a  strong  and 
statistically significant procyclicality. The wage effect is as strong as –1.7 for employees with 
extra payments in the private sector. This implies that the effective wage for those workers 
decreased by 1.7% as reaction to a one point increase in the unemployment rate. Although 
this effect is difficult to compare with average hourly wage effects found for the U.S., it is 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  West  German  labor  market  displays  comparable  wage 
flexibility for this worker group. This suggests that higher flexibility arises for workers with 
wages above the union wage or not covered by collective bargaining, as salaried workers with 
unpaid overtime receive higher average earnings, and are supposedly less likely to be covered 
by  union  wage  setting.
23  Hence,  this  results  provides  indirect  support  for  the  findings  of 
Devereux  and  Hart  (2006)  for  the  U.K.,  where  wage  cyclicality  is  much  higher  among 
workers uncovered by collective bargaining. Moreover, the strong procyclicality of effective 
wages  for  salaried  unpaid  overtime  workers  supports  the  notion  that  unpaid  overtime  is 
prevailing during recessions, and hence decreases the real hourly compensation of the total 
work done, when unemployment is rising. This might be explained by an increase in unpaid 
overtime worked during downturns, when the workers’ bargaining position worsens due to a 
higher risk of losing the job. In addition, this is consistent with the idea that the compensation 
of overtime rather than the amount of overtime hours adjusts over the business cycle.  
 
To sum up, for the majority of workers within employer-employee matches, hourly wages do 
not adjust to the cycle. Therefore, one might conclude that sticky wages are indeed prevailing 
in a relatively inflexible economy like in the German labor market. This finding is consistent 
with recent findings on the U.S. (Devereux, 2001), but in stark contrast to studies on the U.K. 
labor  market,  where  strong  wage  procyclicality  for  job  stayers  was  found  (Hart,  2006a; 
Devereux and Hart, 2006). However, while the non-cyclicality of real wage rates should be a 
property of macroeconomic models for the German economy, it should be kept in mind that 
both hourly paid and salaried workers with additional income from overtime pay or extra 
payments experienced procyclical earnings, which were strongly procyclical particularly in 
the private sector.   
 
In addition to the research presented in this paper, insights should be gained from future work 
on  the  cyclicality  of  real  wages  over  time.  The  finding  that  real  wage  cyclicality  differs 
                                                 
23 Unfortunately, this cannot be analyzed using the SOEP, since the information on whether a worker is covered 
by collective bargaining is not available in the dataset. 
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strongly between different worker groups has helped to identify main contributors of overall 
wage  variability,  and  raises  the  question  as  to  how  the  changing  importance  of  these 
contributors since the mid 1980s has affected wage cyclicality since then. Future research 
should therefore be directed towards the analysis on how the cyclicality of wages varied over 
time, and which factors may have contributed to these changes. The finding that per-period 
earnings were cyclical for hourly workers only if they received overtime payments, may give 
rise to speculations on how the earnings cyclicality developed as a result of the current trend 
in changing overtime compensation.
24 The decline in the fraction of paid overtime hours in all 
overtime  hours  in  Germany,  which  has  been  accompanied  by  more  flexible  working 
arrangements, such as working-time accounts, may have led to a weaker earnings cyclicality 
for hourly paid workers within matches. On the other hand, a decline in the prevalence of 
traditional hourly and salaried methods of payments, and the increasing importance of extra 
payments due to the implementation of new payment schemes, such as incentive pay, might 
have  increased  the  procyclicality  of  both  hourly  paid  and  salaried  workers.  The  higher 
reliance on incentive-based pay, as illustrated in Figure 1, has given firms more scope to 
adjust workers’ compensation to the business cycle, and might have increased overall wage 
cyclicality. Finally, the fall in the fraction of paid extra hours and the trend towards more 
unpaid overtime in the German economy might have led to an increasing procyclicality of 
effective wages, particularly among salaried workers. Future research on the cyclicality of 
wages over time may hence be crucial to derive predictions on how real wages adjust over 
future business cycles. 
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Appendix:  Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1:   Proportion of Workers With Bonus Payments and Share of Bonus 







1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Workers with bonus pay Average share of bonus pay
 
 
Source:   SOEP, 1984-2005 
Sample:  Full-time male employees, age 20-60. 
 













Source: Federal Statistical Office, SOEP (Full-time male employees, age 20-60).  
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Figure 3:   Coefficients on Year Dummies: Hourly Paid and Salaried Workers 
    (within employer-employee matches, 1984-2004) 
 
Hourly paid workers:    Hourly paid workers: with paid 
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Salaried workers: with unpaid overtime, Effective Wage  
 












      Source:   SOEP, 1984-2005 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics: Sample Means and Standard Deviations  
    (within employer-employee matches, 1984-2004) 
 
Variable  All workers  Hourly paid workers  Salaried workers 
Work experience  19.61      (10.59)  20.05   (10.83)  19.13   (10.30) 
Year  1994.9   (6.0)  1994.3   (6.0)  1995.5     (6.1) 
With paid overtime   0.26   0.40   0.10  
With extra payments  0.81   0.78   0.86  
With unpaid overtime   0.12   0.02   0.24  
Public sector  0.20   0.08   0.34  
          
Monthly earnings           
Basic earnings Ys  (in €)  1,998   (918)  1,641   (433)  2,395   (1,128) 
Earnings with overtime and 
extra payments Ya  (in €) 
2,171   (1,042)  1,758   (477)  2,631   (1,281) 
          
Hourly wage           
Standard wage Ws  (in €)  11.02   (5.20)  8.96   (2.41)  13.32   (6.38) 
Average wage Wa  (in €)  12.06   (5.92)  9.69   (2.67)  14.70   (7.27) 
Effective wage We  (in €)  11.66   (5.32)  9.67   (2.67)  13.89   (6.52) 
          
Earnings Changes          
D ln Ys  0.022   (0.192)  0.018   (0.186)  0.027   (0.198) 
D ln Ya   0.020   (0.185)  0.016   (0.179)  0.025   (0.191) 
          
Wage Changes           
D ln Ws  0.026   (0.208)  0.022   (0.206)  0.031   (0.211) 
D ln Wa   0.024   (0.198)  0.020   (0.194)  0.029   (0.202) 
D ln We  0.024   (0.205)  0.020   (0.195)  0.028   (0.215) 
             
Observations  37,999  20,017  17,982 
 
  Source:  SOEP 1984-2005   
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Table 2:  Wage and Earnings Cyclicality of Workers within Employer-Employee 
                 Matches (1984-2004) 
 
  Monthly Earnings  Hourly Wage 
 
Sample (Sample Size) 
Basic 
earnings 








-0.276  -0.450  0.059  -0.160  -0.265  All workers              
(N: 37,999)  (0.407)  (0.394)  (0.438)  (0.421)  (0.473) 
-0.502  -0.691  -0.044  -0.291  -0.384  Workers in the private 
sector (N: 30,251)  (0.438)  (0.429)  (0.449)  (0.435)  (0.491) 
 
  Source:  SOEP, 1984-2005 
  Sample: West German full-time employees, age 20-60. 
  Note:   Robust standard errors in parentheses.     
 
 
Table 3:  Wage and Earnings Cyclicality of Hourly Paid Workers  
      (within employer-employee matches, 1984-2004) 
 
  Monthly Earnings  Hourly Wage 
 
Sample (Sample Size) 
Basic 
earnings 








-0.573  -0.695  -0.107  -0.297  -0.317  All workers              
(N: 20,017)  (0.593)  (0.592)  (0.590)  (0.592)  (0.602) 
-1.008*  -1.158**  -0.434  -0.676  -0.729  Workers with paid 
overtime (N: 6,809)  (0.484)  (0.492)  (0.506)  (0.512)  (0.512) 
-1.043*  -1.222**  -0.410  -0.690  -0.740  Workers with paid 
overtime in the private 
sector (N:  6,466) 
(0.525)  (0.526)  (0.533)  (0.534)  (0.531) 
 
  Source:  SOEP, 1984-2005 
  Sample: West German full-time employees, age 20-60. 
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Table 4:  Wage and Earnings Cyclicality of Salaried Workers  
      (within employer-employee matches, 1984-2004) 
 
  Monthly Earnings  Hourly Wage 
 
Sample (Sample Size) 
Basic 
earnings 








0.059  -0.174  0.245  -0.007  -0.207  All workers              
(N: 17,982)  (0.385)  (0.339)  (0.456)  (0.403)  (0.424) 
0.084  -0.135  0.213  -0.033  -0.154  Workers with extra 
payments (N: 14,157)  (0.368)  (0.345)  (0.408)  (0.386)  (0.389) 
-0.387  -0.671*  -0.073  -0.386  -0.474  Workers with extra 
payments in the 
private sector (N:  
10,015) 
(0.396)  (0.359)  (0.473)  (0.428)  (0.449) 
-0.732  -0.959*  -0.370  -0.647  -0.393  Workers with extra 
payments and paid 
overtime in the private 
sector (N:  2,611) 
(0.615)  (0.505)  (0.607)  (0.537)  (0.602) 
 
  Source:  SOEP, 1984-2005 
  Sample: West German full-time employees, age 20-60. 




Table 5:  Wage and Earnings Cyclicality of Salaried Workers with Unpaid Overtime  
                (within employer-employee matches, 1984-2004) 
 
  Monthly Earnings  Hourly Wage 
 













-0.190  -0.646  0.245  -0.239  -1.244*  All workers              
(N: 3,941)  (0.376)  (0.399)  (0.589)  (0.552)  (0.706) 
-0.215  -0.638  -0.005  -0.440  -1.332*  Workers with extra 
payments (N: 3,405)  (0.366)  (0.412)  (0.621)  (0.599)  (0.738) 
-0.273  -0.825  -0.156  -0.713  -1.705**  Workers with extra 
payments in the 
private sector (N:  
2,607) 
(0.459)  (0.504)  (0.762)  (0.711)  (0.797) 
 
  Source:  SOEP, 1984-2005 
  Sample: West German full-time employees, age 20-60. 
  Note:   Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
   
1 Since the responses with respect to the compensation of overtime are mutually exclusive in the 
SOEP questionnaire, these workers do not receive overtime payments, as they indicated to work 
unpaid overtime.     
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Table 6:  Wage and Earnings Effects of Current and Lagged Unemployment of Salaried  
                Workers with Unpaid Overtime (with. employer-employee matches,1984-2004) 
   
  Monthly Earnings  Hourly Wage 
 
Sample Size: 3,941 
Basic 
earnings 









-0.206  -0.628  0.220  -0.218  -1.268  Current 
unemployment Ut  (0.428)  (0.421)  (0.470)  (0.456)  (0.540)** 
0.174  0.664  -0.270  0.260  1.220  Lagged 
Unemployment Ut -1  (0.445)  (0.427)  (0.482)  (0.455)  (0.551)** 
 
  Source:  SOEP, 1984-2005 
  Sample: West German full-time employees, age 20-60. 
  Note:   Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;     
   
1 Since the responses with respect to the compensation of overtime are mutually exclusive in the 
SOEP questionnaire, these workers do not receive overtime payments, as they indicated to work 
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